Although the U.S. has largely held a monopoly on
targeted drone killings and was able to keep those operations out of public
view for many years, recent developments are creating a need for more
transparency in the U.S. drone program. The targeting of U.S. citizens abroad, which
has also sparked fear of targeting U.S. citizens on American soil, has
increased pressure from growing public and Congressional scrutiny for legal
justification. Pressures are also mounting against the U.S. internationally,
due to the friction created between the U.S. and other countries, particularly
Pakistan, from the increase in civilian casualties caused by U.S. and NATO drone
strikes. The study being conducted by the U.N. surrounding civilian casualties will
likely bring further pressure from the international community for greater
transparency of the U.S. drone program. Furthermore, as other countries begin
to implement their own targeted killing drone programs, such as China and
Russia, the U.S. can use this opportunity to set the standard for the
international community and influence global guidelines on drone policy. In
order for the U.S. to continue the use of drones as a part of its warfare, including
the war on terrorism, the administration must take steps to institutionalize
the program, by refining its standards and creating more transparency.
Both the CIA and
the U.S. military currently manage their own separate drone programs with the
purpose of carrying out targeted drone strikes. However, only the CIA program
is officially considered to be a “covert” mission, meaning that it is deniable
under the law. The military’s program is clandestine, but not covert, and
therefore not deniable under the law. While the Obama administration maintains
that the CIA drone targeting is legally justified under the U.S. Constitution,
the covert status of the operations under the CIA have shielded them from information
requests made through the Freedom of Information Act.
Drone strikes conducted by the CIA have the advantage
of targeting decisions being made within the CIA, with little or no input from
other agencies. While President Obama is involved in some decisions, he does
not sign off on all of them. This allows the CIA significant autonomy and
flexibility on deciding when, where, and how to conduct the strikes.
Intelligence on targets can be acted upon quickly without interference from
outside the CIA, which could otherwise be affected or stopped by regulatory
oversight. Additionally, since intelligence is the main focus of the CIA, the
quality of intelligence on targets is considered to be much higher than is
likely compared with the military’s capabilities.
Another advantage of keeping drone strikes as a covert
operation is that they are not being conducted by the U.S. military, and
therefore can be denied as a type of military combat or infringement on
sovereignty. This is particularly important in countries where the U.S. does
not have forces on the ground, such as Pakistan, and soon Afghanistan. Once
U.S. forces have pulled out of Afghanistan, the use of CIA drones would still
allow the U.S. to keep a light footprint there in order to target Al Qaeda operatives
(and possibly other threats to the Afghan government). While the CIA is
compelled to notify Congress of its intelligence activities, it is not required
to seek input on targeted drone strikes. Therefore, while the covert nature of
the CIA’s drone strikes has significant advantages for U.S. national security
and fighting the war on terror, it does not lend to the oversight and
transparency which are being sought by the American public, Congress, and the
international community.
Shifting the targeted drone program entirely to the
military has the potential to toughen the standards for drone strikes, strengthen
the accountability of the program, and increase transparency. Transferring the
program to the Pentagon would bring it under the oversight of the House and
Senate Armed Services committees. With this oversight, the vetting of targeted
strikes will be subjected to interagency input, adding an extra layer of
accountability. Furthermore, the Pentagon may be subject to budget threats from
Congress if the military withholds information or acts contrary to oversight
committee authority. From the international community’s standpoint, drone strike
operations under the military are likely to be considered more acceptable
because the military considers itself to be bound by international law and the
laws of war. Finally, transferring the program to the military may potentially
increase transparency to the public by the fact that the Pentagon is subject to
requests by the citizen Freedom of Information Act.
Ensuring oversight is dependent on the program within
the Defense Department to which the drone program is transferred. If the
program is transferred to the Joint
Special Operations Command (JSOC), less oversight and transparency can be
expected, as the JSOC operates under different rules than the rest of the
military. The JSOC is equally as secretive as, if not more so, the CIA, and is therefore
less likely to share information about its drone strikes. Furthermore, the JSOC
is not required to report targeted attacks to Congress, which could result in
less oversight than provided under the CIA program. While the administration
should aim to strengthen its imagine at home and abroad by improving the standards
and transparency of the drone strike program, the best option is to incorporate
the CIA’s program into current the current military drone program.
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